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Faith and Credit Clause makes enforceable the judgment of one state in all
others. Once a court of competent jurisdiction in one state has determined that a
defendant is the debtor of a plaintiff, it
will allow an action on the debt in other
states where the defendant has property,
even if the latter wouldn't originally have
had jurisdiction to determine the debt.
A number of reasons why contacts with
a state can support a finding of jurisdiction are given by the Court. A defendant's
claim to property located in a state would
normally indicate an expected benefit
from the state's protection of that property. A state has an interest in assuring the
marketability of property within its borders as well as in providing a procedure
for peaceful resolution of disputes about
posseSSion of the property. Also, there is
the likelihood that important records and
witnesses will be found in the state where
the property is located. The Court notes,
however, that while these and other factors may affect a decision as to jurisdiction, none is necessarily decisive.

It's Alright

Ma (Bell)
by Andrew S. Katz

With a proper order from a United
States District Court, federal law enforcement officials may now compel your local
telephone company to provide facilities
and technical assistance in support of
electronic surveilance operations authorized by warrant. In the decision of United
States v. New York Telephone Company,
46 U.S.L.W. 4033 (Dec. 6, 1977), the
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United States Supreme Court upheld an
order of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York authorizing agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to install pen registers (a
device that records the numbers dialed on
a telephone) and directing the New York
Telephone Company to provide the FBI
with the information and facilities necessary to employ the pen registers covertly
during the investigation of an illegal gambling operation.
The District Court issued the order on
the basis of an FBI affidavit stating that
there was probable cause to believe that
two telephones in Manhattan were being
used in furtherance of illegal gambling activity. The Company refused fully to comply with the court order, locating the lines
that were of interest but refusing to lease
to the FBI unused lines needed to operate
their equipment without notice. Although
the FBI was authorized to compensate the
Company for its assistance, the agents
were advised to string their own cables to
the suspects' apartment, a task impossible
to accomplish without alerting the
suspects. The Company moved in the District Court to vacate that part of the order
directing it to furnish facilities and technical assistance to the FBI on the ground
that the order could only be issued in connection with a wiretap order meeting the
requirements of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. It
denyed that the District Court possessed
authority to give the order under either
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 or the All Writs
Act, 28 U.s.c. § 1651(a). The District
Court held that pen registers are not
governed by Title III because they do not
intercept oral communication, they only
record phone numbers. It claimed jurisdiction to issue the order upon a showing of
probable cause relying upon the authority
of the All Writs Act and its "inherent
powers" to direct the Company to assist
the FBI.
In Application of the United States of
America in the Matter of an Order
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or
Similar Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956
(2d. Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court on the

scope of Title III and the power to authorize pen register surveilance under Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 41. However, the majority also held that "in the absence of
specific and properly limited Congressional action, it was an abuse of discretion
for the District Court to order the
Telephone Company to furnish technical
assistance." 538 F. 2d at 961. The Court
of Appeals warned that "such an order
could establish a most undersirable, if not
dangerous and unwise, precedent for the
authority of the federal courts to impress
unwilling aid on private third parties" and
that "there is no assurance that the court
will always be able to protect (third parties) from excessive or overzealous
Government activity or compUlsion." 538
F. 2d at 962-963. The District Court's
order against the Company was invalidated and a petition for certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court.
Justice White's majority opinion
(joined in by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices BIackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) reviews the language and legislative
history of Title III and concludes that pen
registers are not within the scope of its requirements. Title III is concerned with the
interception of wire or oral communication, "intercept meaning 'the aural aquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device.'
18 U.s.c. § 2510(4). Pen registers do not
acquire the 'contents' of communications .... " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4035.
Therefore, reasons the majority, the District Court had authority to direct the
Company to provide assistance to the FBI
although the pen register order was not in
conformity with Title III.
By holding that the District Court had
power to authorize the installation of the
pen registers, the majority expands the
meaning of search and seizure under Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 41 to include a "search"
to discover the use a telephone is being
put to when there is a suspicion of its involvement in a criminal venture. Rule 41
authorizes warrants for seizures of property or contraband and "property" is
defined to include documents, books,
papers and any other tangible objects.
The opinion states that "it does not

restrict or purport to exhaustively
enumerate all the items which may be
seized pursuant to Rule 41." 46 U.S.L.W.
at 4036. The majority's belief that Rule
41 encompasses authorization for seizures
of such intangibles as dial impulses made
by a telephone is based in part on the
view of Congress, as shown by debate
over Title III, that pen registers pose a
lesser threat to privacy than interception
of oral communications. Further support
for the District Court's authority was
found in Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 57(b)
which provides "If no procedure is speccifically prescribed by rule, the court may
proceed in any lawful manner not inc onsistant with these rules or with any applicable statute."
The majority opinion rejected the
Court of Appeals' position that the order
compelling the Company to provide assistance constituted an abuse of discretion, concluding "that the order issued
here against respondent was clearly
authorized by the All Writs Act and was
consistent with the intent of Congress."
46 U.S.L.W. at 4037. The All Writs Act
provides:

"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all Writs necessary or appropriate in aid

of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and prinCiples
of law." 28 U.S.c. §1651(a).

The District Court was found to have the
power under the All Writs Act to issue any
commands needed to prevent frustration
of orders it had previously issued.
Furthermore, the majority extends the
power to third persons, who although
uninvolved in the original controversy,
are capable of frustrating the implementation of a court order. Examining the facts
of the case the majority concludes, " ...
We do not think that the Company was a
third party so far removed from the underlying controversy that its assistance
could not be permissibly compelled." 46
U.S.L.W. at 4037. Characterizing the
Telephone Company as "a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the
public," the majority found that the Company's duty extended to providing technical assistance when there was probable
cause to believe the Company's facilities
were being used to aid a criminal venture.
Finally, the majority reviewed a 1970
amendment to Title lll, 18 U.S.C.
2518(4), that requires a communication
common carrier to furnish any assistance
necessary to carry-out an electronic interception. The majority reasoned that if

Congresss has made provIsion for compelling the assistance of phone companies
for the conduct of electronic interception
of oral communication, "it would be
remarkable if Congress thought it beyond
the power of the federal courts to exercise, where required a discretionary
authority to order telephone companies to
assist in the installation and operation of
pen registers, which accomplish a far
lesser invasion of privacy." 46 U.S.L.W.
at 4038.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens (joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and in part
by Justice Stewart) admonished the majority for ignoring the principal of limited
federal jurisdiction. This principal, he
states is "never ... more important than
when a federal court purports to authorize
and implement the secret invasion of an
individual's privacy." 46 U.S.L.W. at
4038. The dissent emphasized that Congress has neither given the district court a
direct mandate to issue pen register intercept orders nor has it di rected the courts
to require private parties to provide assistance in execution of its orders. Without a clear authorization from Congress,
the dissent notes, -the federal courts
should not presume the existence of jurisdiction to act; which is precisely what the
majority has done in reaching its decision.
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